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THE EVE OF PARK'S MILITARY RULE: 




Again, let's have another revolution. Revolution is the only way. If some­
one is suffering with an internal disease .. . the only way [to cure itl is to 
open his stomach and fix it, even though he might die in the middle of the 
operation ... 
- Ham S6kh6n 1 
... while there were undoubtedly many intellectuals who mourned democracy's 
passing, the coup was accepted with resignation by most of the populace, 
including the students. How did it happen that the obliteration of the whole 
apparatus of democratic government in one stroke elicited hardly a murmur 
when the rigging of a vice-presidential election under Rhee had led to a 
massive convulsion? 
-James B Palais2 
The Pre-1961 Period: an Overview 
The change in Korea's identity, from international beggar in the early 
1960s to one of Asia's industrial giants today, can only be described as spec­
tacular. This phenomenal change is reflected in Korea's rapid recovery of 
economic momentum following the financial crisis of 1997. By August 2001, 
Korea had completed the repayment of the $58 billion bailout package from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In December the same year, Korea 
became the thirteenth largest trading nation with a per capita GDP of $9,628 
and a literacy rate of over 98 per cent. Korea's economic transformation 
113 
This paper was written whilst I was an Associate 
Visiting Fellow in the Division of Pacific and 
Asian History, Australian National University, 
199&-99. Without the Division's support it 
could not have been written. 
1 Ham S6kh6n, "Kung'min kamj6ng kwa 
hy6ngmy6ng wansu" [The people's emotion 
and completion of revolution], Sasanggye 
(january 1961): 31. 
114 
2 James B. Palais, "Democracy in South 
Korea, 1 948--72," in Without parallel: the 
Americanr-Korean relationship since 1945, 
ed. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1973), p.328. 
3 James Cotton and Kim Hyung-A van Leest, 
'The new rich and the new middle class in 
South Korea: the rise and fall of the golf-re­
public," in The new rich in Asia, ed. Richard 
Robinson and David S. G. Goodman (London: 
Routledge, 1 996), pp. 183-202. 
4 Shim Jae Hoon, "South Korea rose-tinted 
glasses: a troubled nation revives its former 
military leader," Far EasternEconomic Review, 
17 July 1997. 
Cited in ibid. 
'qwsreview, 19 April 1 997, pp.32-3. 
7 Tv "a Ilbo, 19 July 200 1 .  
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has been matched by massive societal transformation. Socially, Korea now 
bustles with new white-collar workers-more widely known as the middle 
class-characterised by high education and skill levels which have enabled 
this group to become an increasingly assertive political force.3 As a result, 
Korea has undergone a noticeable political transformation which, in 2003, 
brought another dramatic change at the grass-roots of Korea's democracy 
when the Korean populace elected Roh Moo-hyun (No Muhy6n), a human 
rights lawyer and relatively unknown politiCian, as President. 
The modern identity of Korea, however, is a new creation largely initiated 
during the era of President Park Chung Hee 0961-79) who rose to power 
through a military coup in May 1961. It is ironic that despite the abundance 
of literature in the past about Park's military coup and his eighteen-year rule 
until his assassination on 26 October 1979, not much information is available 
about Park's concept of economic growth-oriented modernization, a concept 
he militantly pursued from the beginning of his junta leadership. Many slo­
gans such as "Modernization of the Fatherland" (choguk kundaehwa) in the 
1960s and "National Restoration" (minjok chunghung) in the 1970s reflect 
Park's reformist and nationalist approach. This is not to say, however, that 
Park was the originator of these slogans or the plans for modernization. It is 
important to know where Park got these slogans from, what these slogans 
initially meant, and how Park adapted them for his national reconstruction 
program. 
Park's reputation began to soar in early 1997 when Koreans became "fed 
up with President Kim Young Sam's ineffective and scandal-plagued govern­
ment . .. . ,,4 A survey conducted by the prominent daily newspaper, Tonga 
Ilbo (Tonga Daily), in April that year showed the 79.9 per cent of respondents 
considered Park to have been the "most effective president ever."S Another 
survey carried out at Korea University found that students held Park to be the 
third most preferred person in the world for "cloning" for posterity, after Kim 
Ku, the nationalist leader assassinated in June 1949, and Mother Teresa 6 A 
later survey, conducted in July 2001 by the monthly journal Sindonga (New 
Far East), showed that 58 per cent of respondents-out of 3,644 university 
professors-chose Park as "the president who played his role the best" fol­
lowed by Kim Dae Jung with 22 per cent? 
Many critics dismissed this phenomenon as a temporary "syndrome" 
which, they argued, held very little significance in regard to the long-term 
view of the Korean public. This criticism may well be valid. Yet, it is equally 
undeniable that the people's perception of Park had changed remarkably, 
especially concerning his achievements in leading Korea's modernization. In 
this respect, Park's vision of modernization immediately following the coup 
was both timely and representative of popular aspirations, even though Park's 
national development program itself may have done much to reshape those 
popular aspirations. 
This paper examines Korean liberal intellectuals' thinking in regard to 
Korea's path towards national reconstruction during the pivotal period prior 
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to Park's military revolution of 1961. It  focuses on the debate which blos­
somed for eleven months when freedom and democracy followed the Student 
Revolution of 19 April 1960, but which was foreclosed by Park's coup of 16 
May the following year. Understanding this intellectual debate, especially 
among liberal intellectuals, is an important aspect of the unravelling of Park's 
modernization program, which focused especially on economic growth and 
the establishment of a new national ethos. Moreover, the debate during that 
brief period of Korea's histOlY reveals an unambiguous insistence by liberal 
intellectuals on the necessity of strong leadership to achieve economic growth, 
suggesting that Park's coup in 1961 was not merely a response based on his 
own reform agenda and ambition, but also a response to a widespread need 
felt by many Koreans. 
The eve of Park's military rule, from April 1960 to May 1961, was marked 
by two revolutionalY failures. One was the failure of the April Student Revolu­
tion to bring about change in the national leadership elite, despite bringing 
down the Syngman Rhee regime 0948-60). The other was the failure of 
the new government (April 1960-May 1961) and ruling Democratic Party 
leadership to build public confidence in the government's reform program 
focused on uprooting corruption and building the economy. In response, 
there emerged three notable developments: the rise of progressive reformist 
forces; the liberal intellectuals' debate on national reconstruction; and the 
military reformists' "Clean-up the Military" campaign which ultimately led to 
Park's military coup of 16 May 1961. 
A careful consideration of these phenomena, as well as of the legacy of 
the Rhee regime, especially regarding the continuance of conservative politics 
in a Cold War context, is important to understanding Park's military coup 
and his management of national development. Despite the different priorities 
held by interest groups, the pre-1961 debate on national reconstruction by 
liberal intellectuals, progressive reformists, leading academics, media com­
mentators and other politically active groups such as students-reflected 
popular views about national priorities, especially those that had prompted 
the April Student Revolution. The pre-1961 debate, particularly among liberal 
intellectuals, articulated the public need for another "nationalist" revolution. 
The deliberations of the liberal intellectuals provided the basis for an ideol­
ogy that Park would exploit for his military coup and subsequently in his 
approach to national development. 
Recent studies suggest that Park had been conspiring for a long time, wait­
ing for the right opportunity to join with other disaffected military officers 8 
He and his military reformist clique were fortunate in that the intellectual 
and political ferment that followed the April Student Revolution provided a 
convenient pretext for continuing his reform campaign in the military, and 
then the coup. Although initially second-in-charge of the coup, by offering 
strong leadership with economic development as the key national priority 
among others, Park was able to project himself as the appropriate leader. He 
was undoubtedly opportunistic, but also had a genuine capacity to harness 
the people's revolutionary expectations. 
115 
8 Kim Hyung-A, Korea's development under 
Park Chung Hee: Rapid industrialization, 
1961-1979 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2004). 
116 
9 Sasanggye was founded in March 1 953 
by Chang Chunha, a leading intellectual, a 
staunch nationalist and a pro-democracy dis­
sident especially opposed to Park Chung Hee. 
In the late 1960s, Sasanggye is believed to 
have had more than 1 00,000 subscribers, but 
it was closed down by the Park government 
in September 197 0. Chang died in mysteri­
ous circumstances while mountain climbing 
on 17 August 197 5. His death raised much 
suspicion, especially in the leading media 
including Tonga Ilbo. Chang'S mysterious 
death was raised again in March 1993 by 
the Korean television station SBS, which was 
then challenged by the investigation team of 
the monthly journal Wolgan cboson [Korea 
monthly]. Wi51gan cbosOn argued that Chang's 
death was an "accident." See Yi Changhun, 
Kim Yonkwang and U Pyanghyan, "SBS iii 
wi ham ch'anman han obo" [An extremely 
dangerous false report ofSBS], Wi51gan chosOn 
(May 1993): 162-97. 
10 Park Chung Hee, Minjok i1i choryok [The 
nation's intrinsic energy] (Seoul: Kwang­
myang Ch'ulp'ansa, 1 971), p.1 12. 
Figure 1 
Protest (on 6 April) calling/or the 
nUllification 0/ the March 15 
Presidential election . From Saw61 
hy6ngmy6ng charyojip: Sailgu oi minjung­
sa [The April Revolution data collection: 
a people 's h istory oj the April Revolution] 
(Seoul- Hangminsa, 1985), p.38 
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This paper explores the relevance of the pre-1961 intellectual debate to 
the revolutionary environment and the subsequent military coup, by analyzing 
its content and implications based upon materials published in Sasanggye 
(World of Thought), the highly-regarded contemporary monthly journal read 
by politically-conscious Koreans, including liberal-thinking intellectuals.9 
Although the thinking of the liberal intellectuals published in Sasanggye may 
have achieved only a limited dissemination, the journal remains a valuable 
record of the intellectual discussion which influenced, and articulated, public 
expectations of a "nationalist" revolution. Park later reflected: 
Intellectual activity at that time [pre-19611 was in fact exceptional, especially 
that of media commentators who put themselves on the line with the same 
patriotic sense of duty as that prevalent during the Japanese occupation. 
During this period they unealthed all forms of corruption and injustice while 
at the same time impeaching political degeneration, and they implanted in 
the hearts of the people hatred and antipathy towards the Syngman Rhee 
government. 10 
Post-April-Revolution Critique oj Government 
The April Revolution 
The anti-government student protests, known as the April Revolution, or 
simply sa-il-gu (4.19), came to a head on 19 April 1960. On that day, some 
20,000 university and high school students, as well as citizens, marched on 
the presidential mansion, Kyongmudae (the old name of the Ch'ongwadae), 
demanding the censure of sitting politicians and a new election. A riot broke 
out in response to two main public concerns: first, the Rhee government's 
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rigging of the election of 15 March, and second, 
the discovery of the body of a sixteen-year-old 
high school student, Kim Chuyol, offshore at 
Masan, South Kyongsang Province. Kim's body 
had allegedly been thrown into the bay by police 
after he had been killed in a demonstration. !1 
Public outrage intensified into a revolutionary 
situation when, on 18 April, after three days of 
nationwide student protests, a group of Korea 
University students was attacked, in the middle 
of their demonstration, by the Anti-Communist 
Youth Corps, an organized group of political 
gangsters. 
By midday of 19 April, more than 100,000 
citizens had joined the demonstration, but were 
met by a hail of police bullets. Across the city, 
about 130 demonstrators were killed and more 
11 Kim had been missing since the March 1 5  demonstration 
which had resulted in heavy casualties: eight were killed 
and 72 were injured. See Sawol hyongmyong charyojip. 
Sailgu iii minjungsa [The April Revolution data collec­
tion: a people's history of the April Revolution] (Seoul: 
Hangminsa, 1985), p.28. 
Figure 3 
Figure 2 
Street protest against dictatorship and 
corrnption, Saw61 hy6ngmy6ng charyo­
jip: Sailgu Oi minjungsa, cover page 
Floating corpse of Kim Chuyi51 in the port of Masan, Saw61 hy6ngmy6ng 
charyojip: Sailgu Oi minjungsa, p.28 
118 
12 Han'guk Yoksa Yon'guhoe [Society for 
the study of Korean history], Han 'guk yoksa 
[Korean history] (Seoul: Yoksa Pip'yongsa, 
1992), p.381 .  
13 Rhee 0875-1965) was the sixth-generation 
only-son of a ruined yangban family. For 
details of Rhee's background, see Richard C. 
Allen, Korea � Syngman Rhee: an unauthor­
izedportrait (Rutland, Vt. and Tokyo: Charles 
E. Tuttle, 1960); Yi Hanu, KOdaehansaengae: 
Yi St1ngman 90 nyon [A great life: Syngman 
Rhee's ninety years] (Seoul: Choson Ilbosa, 
1995) 
14 Park used this phrase referring to three 
privileged groups in the post-liberation pe­
riod: men who were initially landlords who 
became conservative politicians, new rich 
businessmen, or high-ranking bureaucrats. 
15 The KDP was established with substantial 
American sponsorship on 16 September 1945. 
One of the characteristics of the KDP was its 
close connection with Tonga Ilbo, owned by 
Kim Songsu, one of the eight executives of 
the KDP and later its chairman. 
16 Sim Chiyon, "Hanmindang Oi kujojok pun­
sok kwa tanjong roson" [Structural analysis 
and the unitary government line of the Korean 
Democratic Party], in Han 'guk minjokjut1i ron 
II [A theory of Korea n nationalism Ill, ed. Song 
Konho with Kang Man'gil (Seoul: Ch'angjak 
Kwa Pip'yongsa, 1983), pp. 199-207. 
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than 1,000 wounded.12 The populace was outraged and horrified, and the 
United States was quick to express its concern over the Rhee government's 
actions. On 22 April, many eminent citizens began to demand President Rhee's 
resignation and, indeed, three days later, about 300 university professors 
marched in the streets of Seoul and met in front of the National Assembly to 
demand that Rhee resign. The US also officially demanded the President's 
resignation. Against this background, the Korean Martial Law Commander, 
Lieutenant-General Song Yoch'an, ordered his troops not to fire on anti-gov­
ernment demonstrators. On 26 April, Rhee resigned, placing government in 
the hands of his Foreign Minister, Ho Chong. 
The Rhee Legacy 
Many of the problems faced by Koreans after the war (1950-53) were, 
in their eyes, attributable to the sheer incompetence of the Rhee govern­
ment and its monopoly control over political power. With anti-Communist 
Western-style "democracy" as his political ideology, Syngman Rhee was one 
of the most prominent Korean political leaders since the Japanese colonial 
era. 13 He was inaugurated as the first President of South Korea on 15 August 
1948. The problematic nature of Rhee's idea of anti-Communist democracy 
derived from its feeble imitation of some elements of American-style liberal 
democracy. At the same time, the American Military Government (AMG) in 
Korea (1945--48) had introduced a form of Western-style democracy under 
its strict occupation policy which, in effect, reduced Korea to the status of a 
colony of the US. This combination of democratic objectives, however, ran 
counter to Rhee's personal indigenous ambition to rule Korea in a typically 
East Asian tradition. Rhee's attempt at imitating American-style democracy, 
while pursuing an anti-Communist policy in the Cold War context, thus ex­
posed the political reality of that time, namely, the monopolization of political 
power by the conservatives. 
The conservatives at the time generally comprised representatives of the 
landlord class, or "liberation aristocrats,,,14 who formed political alliances such 
as the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) (Han'guk Minjudang) which, by the end 
of 1947, had almost 86,000 members, including Kim Songsu, Cho Pyongok, 
Ho Chong, Yun Poson and many well-educated individuals. 15 The KDP was 
especially popular among conservative Korean capitalists, with a US Army 
intelligence pamphlet describing it as a group of successful businessmen. 
In short, the conservatives maintained political control after liberation as a 
coalition, irrespective of political party affiliation, and by Korean standards 
in the late 1940s many of them had been seen as "collaborators." Rhee's 
success in acquiring his first Presidency was due largely to his alliance with 
the KDP, which not only enjoyed a virtual monopoly of political power by 
holding key pOSitions in the AMG in Korea, but also had secured Rhee as 
President to maintain its vested interests in Korean politics. 16 Having lived in 
the US for nearly four decades, Rhee had no particular base for his political 
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activities when he returned to Korea in October 1945. 
Once he became President, however, Rhee effectively excluded the KDP 
from his cabinet by admitting just one KDP member, despite the KDP de­
mand-as the largest elected group, having 80 of the National Assembly's 198 
members, that they hold at least half of the ministries, including the post of 
Prime Minister. 17 The establishment of the Liberal Party in March 1952, during 
the Korean War, reflected Rhee's relentless efforts to maintain control over 
opposition conservatives. By the late 1950s, Rhee managed Korea's political 
system without any serious rivals. Even the Democratic Party, which emerged 
in September 1955 from the old KDP in an effOlt to compete against Rhee's 
Liberal Party, did not offer Significantly different ideas or political vision from 
that proffered by the Liberals. 
In any case, Rhee ruthlessly crushed any opposition to his anti-Communist 
conservatism, and focused on his unification policy known as "March north 
and unify Korea" or simply the kugsi (national policy). The execution of Cho 
Pongam for alleged violations of the National Security Law just eight months 
before the 1960 presidential election was the clearest example of Rhee's op­
pressive control over his potential rivals. As leader of the Progressive Party 
(Chinbodang), founded in November 1956, Cho had promoted peaceful 
unification in his 1956 presidential campaign and had surprised Rhee and his 
Liberals by obtaining more than 30 per cent of the total vote. 18 
Rhee thus had no real rivals. As the most prominent "Elder"19 in Korean 
politiCS and society, he commanded unchallenged respect and obedience from 
his subordinates, just as a traditional Confucian father governed his family. 
This phenomenon arose partly because the conservatives, including many 
prominent opposition leaders, had served Rhee at one time or another, and 
partly because, in accordance with Korea's Confucian cultural and political 
tradition, the junior served the senior unconditionally. Pluralism in ideology 
and equality in human relationships were foreign concepts. Rhee's image as 
ruler in an autocracy, however, left him wide open to criticism. The influential 
US report by Conlon Associates in 1960, entitled "United States Foreign Policy 
- Asia," observed: "Korea, as the opposition is threatened and suppressed, is 
a one-and-a-half party system, rather than two political parties.,,20 This report 
by Professor Robert Scalapino and his team was frequently cited by Park in 
an effort to justify his coup. A summary prepared in 1967 by Ch'a Kibyok, 
a prominent political scientist, on the characteristics of the conservatives is 
revealing: 
The political power which has ruled this nation since liberation was the 
Conservatives, mainly the landlord class who were nurtured by the Japanese 
[colonial governmentl. Conservative power was the only one which has 
maintained its existence in the midst of national division devised by foreign 
powers and in the midst of the critical circumstances which resulted from 
the Leftists' and the Rightists' struggle to the extreme .. . .  In short, Dr Rhee 
made the privileged class his basis from which the Korean government 
echoed the voice of foreign powers, but was separated from the people. 
The April 19 [Revolutionl and the May 16 [military coupl were revolts against 
1 19 
17 Han T'aesu, Han 'guk chOngdangsa [A 
history of Korea's political parties] (Seoul: 
Sint'aeyangsa, 1961), p . 1 13 .  
18 For the background to Cho's execution 
and the shutdown of the Progressive Party 
shortly before Cho's execution in July 1956 
see Kwan Taebok, ed., Chinbodang [The 
Progressive Party] (Seoul: Chiyangsa, 1985). 
19 President Rhee was 85 in 1960, and when 
he took his third oath of Presidency at the 
age of81 in 1956 was the world's oldest head 
of state. 
20 See "K'onlon assosieissu pogosa: Miguk ui 
tae asea chOngch'aek" [United States foreign 
policy-Asia: study prepared at the request 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
November, 19591, translated in Sasanggye 
(january 1960): 1 22-9. This report appears to 
have been of such great concern to the Chang 
government that soon after its publication 
in Sasanggye, Professor Scalapino received 
a personal letter from Prime Minister Chang 
asking for a copy, which he requested be sent 
to a US soldier in the Eighth Army in Seoul. 
Author'S interview with Professor Scalapino 
in Canberra, 13 December 1995. 
Figure 4 
President Syngman Rhee in 1960, aged 85 
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Figure 5 
Professor Yu Chin-o, at the time President of Korea University, appealing 
to student demonstrators to break up their protest (19 APril 1967), Saw61 
hy6ngmy6ng charyojip: Sailgu Cli minjungsa, p25 
21 Ch'a Kiby6k, "Sugu sery6k kwa pan­
sugu sery6k'non" [A theory of "the con­
servative force" and "the anti-conservative 
force"]' Sasanggye 0une 1967): 20-l. 
22 ChangChunha, "Kw6ndu6n: Ttotasi uri 
ui hyangbang ul ch'6nmy6ng hamy6nso" 
[Preface: we here again elucidate our 
position], Sasanggye0une 1960): 36. The 
term "simin byi5ngmyi5ng" certainly sug­
gests the particular meaning of bourgeois 
revolution as it does in Japanese and in 
certain Chinese contexts. However, I have 
translated this term literally because no 
source suggests that Korean intellectuals 
at that time used Marxist terms such as 
'bourgeois revolulion'. 
Figure 6 
Police and army guarding the 
Presidential mansion against the 
student demonstrators 
(19 April 1967), Saw6l hy6ngmy6ng 
charyojip: Sailgu ui minjungsa, p.l3 
this conservative power . . .  [and) saw the 
re-appearance of nationalism.21 
In the aftermath of the April Student 
Revolution, many Koreans, particularly 
urban citizens and students, concluded that 
their sitting politicians were corrupt and 
incapable of rooting out corrupt politicians 
and business leaders who had acquired as­
sets illegally. In this context, some liberal 
intellectuals, including Chang Chunha, the 
owner-editor of Sasanggye and a staunch 
nationalist, regarded the April Student Rev­
olution as an expression of collective feeling 
on the part of the citizens, defining it as a 
"simin hyongmyong" (civilian revolution), 
as well as a "chisongin ui hyongmyong" 
(intellectuals' revolution) for democracy,22 
a democratic revolution aimed especially at 
achieving political and economic freedom. 
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Pak Chonghong, Professor of Philosophy at Seoul 
National University, stated: 
It is indisputable that through the April Student 
Revolution there emerged genuine intellectual 
thought, which was as yet obscure and immature, 
because it was only a bud. As an ideology, this 
intellectual thought had not yet reached the level 
oftheorywith a systematic structure. Nevertheless, 
it was an invaluable guide, a new thought that 
we must not discard . . . . 23 
Pak argued that the April Student Revolution 
succeeded because of "creative intelligence" and 
"many objective conditions." According to him, the 
April Student Revolution was a genuine manifest­
ation of Korean ideology, transforming into action 
the Korean people's sense of justice in regard to their 
"minjokch6k chuch 'es6ng," that is, their national 
independence or national self-reliance. He therefore 
identified the emergence of this populist "Korean 
ideology" as "our ideology."Z4 Its content was 
quick to find expression in the debate on national 
23 Pak Chonghong, "Sasang kwa haengdong" [Ideology and 




"Let's recover the election with blood''­
a banner actually inscribed in blood, 
Saw6l hy6ngmy6ng charyojip: Sailgu Oi 
minjungsa, p.38 
Figure 8 
Professors from the various univers­
ities in Seoul calling for democracy, in 
front of Capital Hall (25 April 1967), 
Sawol hyongmyong charyojip: Sailgu Oi 
minjungsa, p. 1 1  
122 
25 Sin Sangch'o, "Yi SOngman p'okchong 
Oi chongon" [The end of Syngman Rhee's 
tyrannical government], Sasanggye Qune 
1960): 86. 
26 Song Konho, "60.70 nyondae Oi t'ongil 
noni" [The unification debate of the 1960s 
and 1970s], in Han 'guk minjokjuuiron II, 
'.162. 
2', lam Sokhon, "Kung'min kamjong kwa 
hyo. >myong wansu," p.31 .  
28 Sin � '1gch'o, "Yi SOngman p'okchong iii 
chongon, ».87. 
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reconstruction that was to follow. The irony of the April Student Revolution, 
however, was that while the students were the victors, the spoils of victory 
went to the same conservatives, although this time to remnant conservatives 
who made up the Interim and Chang Myon Governments. 
The Interim and Chang My6n Governments 
Sin Sangch'o, a prominent political analyst in the 1960s, suggested that 
the April student revolutionaries had four aims: to overthrow the dictator, 
President Rhee; to eradicate the old ruling power linked to Rhee; to establish 
a new economic order; and, to reorganize the societal system which had 
provided the supporting framework for the dictator.25 Of the four, only the 
first aim was achieved. Ham Sokhon, a well-known Quaker and a writer 
who was regarded by many leading intellectuals as an "elder of the eminent 
persons out of office, ,,26 argued that the April Student Revolution stopped 
with its first goal because both the interim and Chang governments were too 
weak to take resolute action against corrupt politicians while indulging in 
opportunism and factionalism.27 In a similar vein, Sin Sangch'o observed that 
changing government from one headed by the Liberal Party to one headed 
by the Democratic Party would achieve nothing 28 
For two main reasons, the Interim Government of Ho Chong had limited 
capacity to carry out the revolutionary tasks demanded by the people. In the 
first place, Ho Chong, an old friend of President Rhee and a member of the 
former ruling Liberal Party, retained primary loyalty to his party and, secondly, 
the new Democratic Party, soon to constitute the Chang Government, put the 
Interim Government under pressure as early as July 1960. Nevertheless, the 
interim government quickly drafted a new constitution in order to redress the 
imbalance between executive and legislative power. Yun Poson 0897-1990) 
was elected on 29 July as a figurehead president devoid of effective power, 
while genuine political power was vested in the State Council headed by 
the Prime Minister, Chang Myon 00hn M. Chang). What was assumed in this 
process was Korea's preparedness for liberal democracy or, at least, to adopt 
a democratic socio-political framework. 
Despite this bold beginning, however, the Chang Myon Government 
was swamped with many challenges from within its own ruling Democratic 
Party as well as from the three major external reformist groups: the progres­
sives, the Teachers' Union, which led the labor movement, and university 
students. Within the Party, the challenges arose entirely from factional strife 
that had reached an irreconcilable stage when Chang Myon, leader of the 
"New Faction," only succeeded by a margin of three votes in acquiring the 
prime ministership. Consequently, the government lacked the unity, political 
integrity and discipline necessary for exerting leadership. Members formed a 
divided and directionless legislature, which the media characterized as a body 
that, possessing no ideology, no integrity and no ability, behaved like a Don 
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Quixote without self-understanding 29 Chang was not unaware of the task 
before him and, to his credit, his government introduced long-term economic 
planning for the first time, while also pursuing the decentralization of the 
political system. Despite these efforts, however, many critics, including Sin 
Sangch'o, argued that if the two factions of the Democratic Party had been 
united and exercised their revolutionary power, the people's enthusiasm 
would have been satisfied.3° 
Finally, in addition to political factionalism, the economy was far from 
healthy. Inflation was crippling: the price of rice increased by 60 per cent 
and coal and oil prices by 23 per cent in four months, from December 1960 
to April 1961. Between November and February, national production fell 
more than 12 per cent.31 Simultaneously, the recorded crime rate more than 
doubled, while the felony arrest rate dropped from 90 per cent to 68 per 
cent. The rate of unemployment lingered at the unacceptably high levels of 
23.4 per cent in 1959 and 23.7 per cent in 1960. At about the time of the 
April Student Revolution, the number of unemployed had reached two and 
a half million. The underemployed in rural areas numbered almost two mil­
lion, with the rural economy in a perilous state.32 Some historians state that 
over a million farming households suffered food shortages in the spring of 
1960 and more than nine million children throughout the country regularly 
went without lunch.33 
Clearly, a vicious cycle of poverty had set in. This was exacerbated by 
low social morale which was not helped by the government's inability to take 
the strong action necessary to achieve the sweeping changes that the public 
demanded. They wanted a thorough and rapid purging of all individuals 
and groups who were closely connected to the Rhee Government's election 
rigging, illicit profiteering and other forms of official corruption at high levels. 
Prime Minister Chang and his party, however, repeatedly compromised their 
position in this regard by tampering with the list of suspects, especially those 
who were high-ranking militalY officers and leading businessmen. In disgust, 
Ham S6kh6n wrote: 
What is the achievement of the government of Chang Myon to date, not to 
mention the Interim Government of H6 Chong? Winter is nearly here while 
[the politicians] are busy with factional strife. There is not a single production 
line which runs properly while the minjung [masses] cry out only for their 
plight. The rats [corrupt politicians] captured in the cabinet have all run away. 
Not to mention the fact that they are not capable of catching additional new 
rats while they lose those that were caught by others! . . .  Anyhow, why is 
the government so hesitant to deal with the trapped rats? Is it that the cat is 
too old or sated with stolen food?34 
The contrast between the clarity of this insight and the lack of strong ac­
tion in the government is stark and can be seen as an illustration of why the 
public demanded sweeping reforms. In fact, their demand for revolutionary 
change inspired urban citizens, including students, to accept the military coup 
123 
29 Om Kihyong, "Han'guk chongch'iindul Di 
chongCmdaes6ng" [The pre-modern charac­
teristics of Korean politicians], Sasanggye 
(March 1961) 131 
30 Sin Sangch'o, "Chwadamhoe: Kis6ng 
chongch'iin Di solchikhan paron" [Discussion: 
frank expression of established politicians], 
Sasanggye (August 1961) :  146. 
31 Han 'guk Ilho, 23 April 1961 
32 Han Wansang, Yi Wujae, Sim Oit'aek, et ai., 
4.19 hyongmyongnon [On the April Revolu­
tion] (Seoul: Iiwolsogak, 1983), pp.74-5. 
33 Han 'guk yoksa [Korean history] (Seoul: 
Yoksa Pip'y6ngsa, 1 992), p.382. 
34 Ham S6kh6n, "Kung'min kamjong kwa 
hyongmyong wansu," p.31 
124 
35 Song Yubo, "4w61 hy6ngmyong kwa t'ongil 
noni" [A discussion on the April revolution 
and unificationl, in Han 'guk minjokjuui ron 
II, p .141 .  
36 Song Konho, "60.70 nyondae ui  t'ongil 
noni," p.l 50. 
KIM HYUNG-A 
less than nine months after the inauguration of the Chang Government, with, 
in James B. Palais' words, "hardly a murmur." 
Progressive Reformist Movements 
One of the hottest socio-political issues of the pre-1961 intellectual debate 
was the progressive reformists' campaign for the "peaceful unification" of North 
and South Korea. The left-inclined progreSSive reformists and non-political 
groups, including university students, exploited the openness of the Chang 
Government. As discussed above, peaceful unification as an alternative policy 
had been quashed when Cho Pongam, leader of the Progressive Party, was 
executed in July 1959 and the progressive forces were thereby muted. In the 
campaign prior to the national election in July 1960, however, the issue of 
peaceful unification was again promoted by both the ruling Democratic Party 
and the progressive political parties, such as the Socialist Mass Party (Sahoe 
taejungdang), the Socialist Reform Party (Sahoe hyoksindang) and the Korea 
Socialist Party (Han'guk sahoedang). 
A notable characteristic of these so-called "progreSSive political forces" 
was that, as one observer pointed out, they did not necessarily share the same 
ideological goals or background.35 Members of the Socialist People's Party, 
for example, included former members of the Progressive Party. In contrast, 
the Korea Socialist Party led by Chon Chinhan included former members 
of the right-wing union movement after Liberation. Thus the progressive 
forces at the time represented nothing less than every political group that 
had been excluded from the political system under the Rhee government. 
While progressive reformists debated Korea's unification, university students 
campaigned even more vigorously for a similar cause. More than a dozen 
universities throughout the country, for example, formed the Society for 
the Study of National Unification (Minjok t'ongil yon 'guhoe) within a few 
months of the formation of the League of National Unification (Minjok t 'ongil 
yonmaeng or simply Mint 'ongyon) by Seoul National University students on 
1 November 1960. 
By early 1961, more than twenty high schools had formed their own So­
ciety for the Study of National Unification. Amidst this unification craze, many 
Koreans, especially conservative politicians, intellectuals, businessmen and 
military officers, became increasingly anxious about the threat to socio-political 
stability posed by the widespread rejection of anti-Communism. Some of the 
media, such as the Minjok I1bo (National Daily), first published in February 
1961, followed a pro-active left wing policy. Communist sympathy, from the 
viewpoint of the conservative Koreans, had progressed far enough when, 
on 3 May, the members of the mint'ongyon from Seoul National University 
called for a meeting among students from both North and South Korea. The 
students openly appealed to North Korea: "Brothers, come to us and let us 
march together! ... Let's go to the North! Come to the South! Let us meet in 
P'anmunjom. ,,36 
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The anxiety of Koreans about the growing social unrest reached new 
heights when, on 13 May, over ten thousand citizens and students staged a 
public rally chanting "Old Generation Get Out!" and "Yankee Go Home!," 
and calling for unification.37 Despite serious problems and contradictions 
in the Korean social system, most Koreans were not prepared for the social 
disruption that came with free expression, especially the controversy sur­
rounding the unification campaigns conducted by progressive reformist 
forces. Given that the military coup was staged amid this social turmoil, it is 
not too difficult to understand how the coup leaders would have won over 
the public, particularly the conservatives, by their massive purge of left-wing 
progressive reformists just three days after their seizure of power,38 and how 
they were able to promote their coup as an act of "patriotism" to save the 
nation from crisis. 
The Debate Prior to 1961 
Irrespective of the unification issue, by April 1961 many leading liberal 
intellectuals sought to build Korea around two themes: construction of 
economic prosperity and reformation of the national character. The minimal 
expectation of the April Student Revolution had been " . . .  a society which is 
at least capable of feeding and clothing its people.,,39 To achieve this goal, 
intellectuals argued for national stability and autonomy through labor man­
agement and free enterprise within a planned economy. In a special feature 
article in the March 1960 edition of Sasanggye entitled "A free economy or a 
planned economy?" (Chayu kyongjenya, kyehoek kyongjenya?)" economic com­
mentators, including Yi Ch'angyo, Professor of Economics at Korea University, 
argued that Korea should utilize a "mixed economic system" (honhap kyongje 
ch 'eje) in which Korean industry would seek to absorb the unemployed most 
efficiently by focusing on certain industries. Furthermore, according to Yi, 
Korean industry also needed to find the most effective means of allocating 
materials, resources and demand to allied industries. Yi argued: 
The economic direction that we require must be a kind of mixed economic 
system. We obviously lack the necessary accumulation of national capital. 
We also lack endeavor and our natural resources are scarce. But we have 
an excessive surplus of labor. In order to lead this labor force near to full 
employment, there needs to be a kind of "supply effect. "  This effect can be 
regarded as a form of imbalanced development. By selecting a celtain group 
of industries, regardless of whether a market exists or not, and by maintaining 
their development through intensive investment, even by force-not through 
so-called free competition but through planned investment, it is intended to 
stimulate the productivity of other industries spontaneously with the sup­
ply of materials that would be produced through such development . . .  . It 
should be clear that it is very difficult to expect balanced economic growth 
in our current condition 40 
The planned economy argument was largely, although not exclusively, 
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based on the West German model, seen by intellectuals as pre-eminent in the 
ideological conflict between East and West Germany. The much discussed 
"German economic miracle" was viewed as having been achieved by "develop­
ing economic strength to the maximum, utilizing a strategy which, on the one 
hand, adopted the principle of democratic free enterprise and, on the other, 
managed a planned economy under rationalized controL ,,41 In viewing the 
Korean condition of Cold War politics, however, Cho Kagy6ng, Professor of 
Philosophy at Seoul National University, argued in Sasanggye in April 1961, 
"Communism is not a force which can be eradicated by [a theoretical] oppo­
sition. The infiltration of Communism can be blocked only by the strength of 
an economy which is self-reliant (charip) and self-sufficient (chajok). ,,42 
Similarly, in his 1961 essay, "Re-evaluation of the April Student Revolution" 
(Saw6l hy6ngmy6ng ui chaep 'y6ngkka), the leading historian Hong Is6p argued 
that Korean society must be "revolutionized" in order to establish economic 
prosperity. Referring to the Korean economy under various political systems 
throughout history, from the feudal dynasty to the Rhee government, Hong 
observed that the present government (of Chang My6n) must concentrate 
immediately on changing economic structures. He called for reform in order 
to tackle three major tasks: first, the reorganization of debts in all farming 
and fishing villages; second, the reallocation of land to tenant farmers; and 
third, securing both fishery and agricultural products including fertilizer 43 
In the end, many leading academics and intellectuals shared the economists' 
view that, "All problems are due to economics" (modun munje nun ky6ngje 
ro t 'onghanda).44 
The Call for Chuch'es6ng 
At the core of the call for Korea's " chuch 'es6ng" (independence/autonomy) 
in politics and the economy, especially government decision-making, there 
emerged a strong sense of self-awakening, as well as resentment about de­
pendence on the United States. Many educated urban citizens argued that 
Korea's foreign policy needed revision, particularly the lopsided ROK-US 
Status-of-Forces Agreement which proved incapable of preventing criminal 
activity by US soldiers in Korea, let alone respecting the Korean government's 
sovereign right to govern without US domination. In the May 1961 edition, 
Sasanggye published a letter submitted by a first-year student from Korea 
University. 
It is said that Korea's foreign policy is a 'Yes, Sir!' policy . . . . At a time like 
this when Korea is not even at war after the establishment of the armistice, 
US soldiers stationed in Korea cut Korean women's hair at random and de­
liberately kill a perfectly normal boy. And yet, the Korean government has 
neither the right to punish those criminals nor the status to voice its views on 
such conduct. [In this situation], how can Korea be an independent nation 
and not a dependency of the US?45 
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An equally upsetting aspect of US policy in Korea, according to one tech­
nical executive, was US management of aid, which, he argued, was lopsided, 
unilateral and managed with political coercion to maximize America's own 
national and commercial interests.46 Similarly, another economic observer 
argued that while the structure of the US aid program established an initial 
framework for the Korean economy, it nevertheless created what he termed, 
"dependent state monopoly capitalism" (chongsokchok kukka tokchom cha­
bonjutti). This phrase, it should be noted, became one of the most power­
ful dictums of Korean democracy activists and university students in their 
subsequent struggle against Park's state-led economic development during 
the 1970s 47 
By November 1960, intellectual criticism of US aid policy complemented 
the anti-American mood of the general public, with Sasanggye featuring this 
theme in its November 1960 and March 1961 issues. Under the heading "Is 
it Autonomy or Dependency?" (Charip inya? Yesok inya?) Pu Wanhy6k, an 
economic analyst, and Cho Tongp'il characterized American aid policy in 
Korea and its inevitable consequences as the major source for weakening 
and undermining Korea's political and economic chuch 'esong, especially in 
terms of decision-making on national affairs. Cho commented: 
The American aid program hitherto implemented in Korea has failed to 
achieve any particular effect in creating economic conditions conducive to 
building economic independence. Instead, it has increased the degree of 
Korea's economic dependence and intensified Korea's dependence on the 
American economy . . . .  Because of this, the masses in Korea, I suspect, would 
think that the [Korea-America] Economic Aid Agreement this year was also 
intended to intensify Korea's dependence [on America] 48 
Cho argued that Korea needed to take a new direction in accepting 
American aid if its aim was to establish national autonomy. He identified 
US aid policy as the main reason for the backwardness of countries in other 
regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia. He believed the emergence 
of anti-Americanism among some countries was due to an American aid 
policy that was designed primarily for America's own economic interests.49 
This criticism was not restricted to a handful of liberal intellectuals and their 
supporters. By March 1961, public resentment towards the US aid program 
became so intense that it popularized anti-Americanism coupled with a new 
wave of nationalism emphasizing Korea's chuch 'esong. In observing this 
nationalistic anti-American climate, the US Embassy in Seoul reported to its 
State Department as follows: 
During recent months there has been a growing questioning of the U.S.  
[sic] position in the ROK, focusing on the question of ROK sovereignty, US 
economic aid, and on demands for a Status of Forces Agreement. In this cli­
mate of criticism there has developed a public hypersensitivity regarding the 
effectiveness of US aid, especially as concerns a lack of long range economic 
development and of our involvement in the ROK economic decision-making 
process. The controversy over ratification of the economic aid agreement, 
the negative public reaction to press reports of Under Secretary Ball's speech 
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on 7 March in Chicago, and the disproportionately extravagant, favorable 
press treatment of the recently concluded ROK-West German Technical Aid 
Agreement, are illustrative of this public climate 50 
It is true that the anti-American climate became a recognizable social 
phenomenon only after the April Student Revolution. But this does not 
necessarily mean that the Korean people as a whole bore no deep-seated 
resentment towards the US, particularly regarding its role in the division of 
their country into North and South Korea. In fact, just a month after the April 
Student Revolution, Cho Sunsong, Professor of Political Science at Seoul 
National University, openly blamed the US for the division of the Korean 
nation. He argued: 
Korea's division was a tragedy created by the 'politics of power' between the 
Great Powers, which Korea could not help avoid . . . .  As a victorious nation 
in World War II, America held hegemony in world politics through which 
she could exercise her dominance in any way she wished . . . .  [Therefore,] 
today's tragedy [of Korea] would have been avoided if America had thought 
through the future implications for Korea and prepared for it by planning a 
resolute policy toward Korea, to defend her against the diplomatic offensives 
of the Soviet Union 51 
Cho concluded that Korea had been a victim of the particular style of US 
foreign policy. President Hany Truman's foreign policy, according to Cho, 
had been one of military diplomacy predominantly focused on producing 
immediate victories rather than long-term outcomes. As a consequence, Cho 
asserted, America made a "big mistake" when it suggested the 38th parallel to 
the Soviets and thereby scattered the seeds of tragedy on the Korean penin­
sula 52 This open criticism by liberal intellectuals of American foreign policy 
clearly influenced the Chang Myon Government and the ruling Democratic 
Party. On 18 April, for example, the National Assembly passed a three-pOint 
resolution which, in the words of MacDonald summarizing US State Depart­
ment archives: 
(1) urged long-range economic planning by both the ROK and the United 
States to produce economic self-suffiCiency and improved living standards; 
(2) asked the United States to 'give the fullest consideration to the sovereign 
rights of the Korean government in the administration of the economic aid 
plan, '  while Korea paid full respect to American advice; (3) called for a 
nationwide austerity drive, emphasizing rehabilitation of the rural economy 
and of basic industries, with U.S.  poliCies to support this goal 53 
This resolution is noteworthy because it showed the prevailing preparatory 
state of the Chang Government's long-range economic planning after Prime 
Minister Chang had instructed the Economic Development Council to draw 
up a five-year development plan at the end of 1960.54 In fact this resolution, 
according to Macdonald, did not reach the US Embassy until three days after 
the military coup. By then, Park and his military junta had already adopted 
key elements of the resolution as their platform for reform, including the first 
Five-Year Development Plan. 
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The Cal/for a People 's Revolution 
Rather than looking for solutions in specific problem areas of the economy 
or particular aspects of national dependency, Ham S6kh6n called for an all­
out people's revolution. Building a new nation, according to Ham, could not 
be achieved without a revolution of the national character. Historically, the 
fundamental cause of the Korean people's sufferings, he argued, was due 
mainly to the weakness of the national character and the only way to change 
the national character was to have a people's revolution 55 Ham's call for 
another revolution first appeared in the January 1961 number of Sasanggye, 
and again in a three-part essay entitled, "How do we build a new nation?" 
(Saenara rul ott okke seulkka?) published in the April to June numbers of the 
journal. In his discussion of the Chang My6n Government's National Land 
Construction Movement, Ham called for what he termed a "revolution of 
the national spirit": 
The National Land Construction [Movement] itself is in fact a revolution. 
This project cannot be accomplished without a revolutionary spirit. This is 
a bloodless revolution . . . . Therefore, there are things to throw away and 
things to build anew. What should we throw away? Let us throw away our 
habits of factionalism, flunkeyism, fatalism and idleness, our prestige-oriented 
life principle and dependent mentality . . . .  What should we build anew' Let 
each of us own 'self before anything else; let us have the spirit of unity; let us 
cultivate an enterprising spirit; let us have a more i nquiring mind; and let 
us positive(y build a new confidence. 56 
Ham believed that a new revolution must be managed differently so the 
ordinary people would be educated and empowered to participate in "nara il" 
(national tasks). According to Ham, this revolution required a change in the 
people's attitude, including that of intellectuals: " . . .  no revolution is possible 
without intellectuals who represent the middle stratum of society. However, 
they have a weakness for wanting to rise up like a balloon. As a result, the 
people always become deluded.,,57 Stressing education, equality, and the 
need to instill a national sense of self-worth, Ham asserted that Korea's social 
system, which he referred to as the "master frame," had to change before 
anything else. He wrote: 
Men are the servants of a system, of a [value-system] framework, because they 
are social beings. There cannot be a society without a certain framework, just 
as an individual cannot conceive his or her own mind without possessing 
a body. Although men create the [social] framework, it also in turn creates 
men . . .. [IJf anyone desires to form newborn babies into a new people, one 
must first of all change the whole framework of society 58 
Ham added that this frame had to be built on two common principles: 
"hamyon pand usi toenda" Cit will certainly happen if you try) and "minjung 
ui  kasumman pogo kara" (proceed focused only on the feelings of the work­
ing masses).59 These mass-oriented community ideals subsequently became 
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the conventional rhetoric of Korean nationalism as promoted by two major 
camps: the student-led working masses' human rights campaign and their 
democracy movement, and the state-led rapid development under Park and 
his successors. The fact that Ham never approved of Park, or served under 
him, is not important. What is Significant, however, is that Ham's call for a 
people's revolution to rebuild the national character and spirit provided a 
basis for Park to justify his reform agenda after the coup-even though Park's 
idea of reform was all top-down and thus the complete opposite of Ham's 
idea of a "bottom-up" revolution, in which the mass of the people would 
undergo a transformation of values. By using Ham's language, in other words, 
Park appealed for "bottom-up" public support for and confidence in his junta 
leadership and his subsequent development policies. 
By October 1960, the established terminology, national independence/ 
autonomy, whether expressed as minjokch6k chuch 'es6ng or minjokch6k 
chajus6ng, referred to the state and the people's pursuit of a "Korean-style" 
philosophy of life, ethics and social order. Professor Pak Chonghong's inter­
view with An Pyonguk, entitled "Philosophy exists within daily life" (Ch '6Ihak 
un saenghwal sog e itta), discussed the search for "a new world view, a new 
value-system, new behavioral rules and a new morality, all of which had to 
be based on minjokch6k chuch 'es6ng. ,,60 In a related article, Pak outlined 
his thoughts on why a nation requires an ideology and its essential criteria, 
and on the need for the Korean people to identify an ideology as "our ideol­
ogy." Pak stated: 
Ideology is something which can entirely determine one's action and direction 
and something to which one cannot help but respond completely because it 
thoroughly touches one's heart and soul. Ideology must therefore not only be 
part of one's flesh and blood, but must also be defined in terms of matters 
which have been the subject of everyone in this nation's heartfelt outcry 
. . .  our ideology must be unearthed from our own thought and be defined 
by ourselves, not by others. In this way, our ideology becomes something 
by which we live and to which, if possible, we will give our lives without 
a second thought and for which we would gladly die without regret.  Only 
that sort of ideology can become our [very own) ideology 61 
Accordingly, the terms minjok chuch 'es6ng and Han 'gukch6k chuch 'es6ng 
implied "our ideology." These fundamentally nationalistic terms symbolized 
a new Korean perspective, which not only emphasized the importance of 
national autonomy and the rejection of foreign dominance, dependency 
and flunkeyism, but also promoted the value of hard work, creativity and 
patriotism. Importantly, historical and cultural tradition was called upon to 
serve as a foundation for the new ideology. The use of the words, chuch 'e 
and chuch 'es6ng, however, calls for particular attention, especially when 
it is juxtaposed to North Korea's adoption of ''juch 'e sasang" (self-reliance 
ideology) as its "only ideology" after the Communist Party's Fourth Congress 
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in September 1961 62 
I have found no evidence, however, of South Korean intellectuals of that 
time focusing on Kim II Sung's Juch 'e Cchuch 'e) ideology. At the same time, 
it is reasonable to assume that intellectuals in South Korea were not entirely 
unfamiliar with North Korea's promotion of the term minjok chuch 'esong 
which was based on the historical notion of anti-flunkeyism and national 
independence that held sway in the 1920s. Although Park may well have been 
familiar with the Japanese concepts of shutai ::tR and shutaiteki ::tR1¥J63 
from his colonial days, he also adopted Pak Chonghong's interpretation of 
the term chuch 'esong as the official stance for the state's economic national­
ism. It was no coincidence that Pak Chonghong later authored the National 
Charter of Education which, in December 1968, was officially declared as a 
manifesto of Park's leadership ideology. 
Agenda for National Reconstruction 
Chang Chunha, an ardent nationalist liberal intellectual and the publisher­
editor of Sasanggye 0953-67), informed his readers in his February 1961 
editorial that, "Only hard work can save Korea.',64 He argued that construct­
ing an efficient labor system was the only way to transform Korea into an 
"Advancing Fatherland." Chang called for a change in social ethics so that the 
nation would develop a genuine appreciation of diligence and hard work. 
To achieve such change, and in order to rebuild a society that was sluggish 
and lacked will, the government needed to cultivate a strong ethos amongst 
the people to promote practicality, plainness, saving, stability, trust, and 
constructiveness. He stated that it was economically essential to establish a 
labor management system. However, Chang believed that in backward na­
tions such a system was only possible 
under a far-sighted plan and thought-out policies provided by an em­
powered government [under] strong leadership . . . .  Therefore, Korea needs 
more desperately than ever a government that will effectively implement 
our historical tasks according to a plan which is not weak or temporary but 
thoroughly tested, and with strong leadership 65 
By referring to "liberal democracy" as a precondition for national recon­
struction, Chang's prescription for social reform, proceeding under a "strong 
leader" and "guided democracy," called for a morally superior political leader 
who would direct his people in the task of nation-building. Likewise, many 
other leading liberal intellectuals, including Kim Sanghyop, Sin Sangch'o and 
Han T'aeyon, also used the term "liberal democracy" in conjunction with 
"strong leadership." Under the slogan "changing the national character for 
the better," these intellectuals highlighted the fundamental necessity for the 
Korean people to adopt a spirit of "diligence and frugality." They argued that 
a new Korean ethos founded on these two virtues, combined with strong 
leadership, was crucial for national reconstruction. The building of a "liberal 
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democratic nation-state, "  according to these liberal intellectuals, required a 
"young and revolutionary leader.,,66 In the April 1961 issue, Sasanggye pub­
lished the full text of "On heroic leadership and the dilemma of strong men 
and weak peoples" by Arthur SchleSinger, jun., aiming to reinforce public 
feeling about the government's weak leadership. Sasanggye, attempting to 
stimulate intellectual debate, also featured the article, "A theory regarding 
the Korean people's inferiority complex.,,67 
In the following month, Sasanggye focused on the Korean value-system 
by introducing five feature articles under the theme of the re-examination of 
Korean value consciousness. The chaotic condition of Korean society was 
believed to be mainly "due to the absence of [strong] leadership" and due 
to the "loss of harmony and consistency in new value-systems which have 
spread widely in Korean society.,,68 Intellectuals argued that the problems of 
weak leadership and poor national character were responsible for the low 
self-esteem of the Korean people. In examining the causes of the Korean 
inferiority complex and its psychological processes, Chong Yangun, a pro­
fessor of psychology, described the contemporary images of Korea before 
1961 as follows: 
In the olden days, we were told that our neighboring countries admired our 
civilization so that they wished to learn from us. They regarded our nation 
as the 'Eastern Land of Refinement.' But what is the current situation? Some 
comments we occasionally hear about Korea from abroad indicate that Korea 
is seen as a nation similar to hell on earth: it is a nation of thieves, it is packed 
with beggars and vagrants, and it is a smelly nation strewn with rubbish 69 
Chong outlined three reasons for the inferiority complex. The first was 
Korea's long history of playing second fiddle to superior powers in the arena 
of world politiCS. Korea served China as her "servant" throughout the five 
hundred years of the Yi dynasty 0392-1909); was then subject to Japanese 
colonial rule (1910-45) which led the "nation to her critical stage of ruin"; and 
finally was liberated, except that liberation was not achieved by the Koreans 
themselves, but rather was presented to them by the American forces as an 
outcome of the US victory in World War II. Chong argued that the image cre­
ated by the global perspective that Korea, historically, was an inferior nation 
inevitably affected the psychology of the Korean people. 
The second reason, Chong suggested, was the Korean people's disillusion­
ment with their own culture which, he asserted, seemed to be dispensable 
whenever a foreign culture invaded Korea. This phenomenon was blamed 
on the historical perception that Korea possessed no distinct culture of its 
own and consequently possessed no indigenous cultural basis. As a result, 
Chong concluded, Koreans were inevitably burdened with an inferiority 
complex caused by self-disillusionment. Chong's third reason was Korea's 
economic inferiority which, he argued, rendered the nation too easily subject 
to foreign dominance.7o Chong had put his finger on three factors which, he 
averred, combined to produce a massive Korean inferiority complex. The 
intellectuals accordingly called for the Korean people to undertake a search 
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for self-knowledge and understanding. Yi Man'gap, Professor of Sociology at 
Seoul National University, asserted that whoever wished to know the work­
ings of the Korean mind had to "discover the psychological characteristics of 
the Korean people and know the objective circumstances in which Koreans 
are placed. ,,71 The "objective circumstances" referred to the complex and 
oppressive history of Korea's "pre-modern value-system." 
According to Yi's school of thought, the Korean people's self-image, espe­
cially that of the commoners, had been shaped entirely by despotic Confucian 
feudalism. In the words of Ham S6kh6n, " ... the minjung [masses] were 
treated like filthy maggots, ,,72 and so they perceived themselves. Up until the 
1960s, common terms used by Koreans to describe themselves were "cheap 
cash" (y6pch6n) and "straw shoes" (chip 'sin), which represented prev:alent 
self-images of the ordinary Korean working masses. Yi Man'gap linked these 
perceptions of the Korean people to their flunkeyism: 
On the one hand, [Koreans) abuse their own people but, on the other hand, 
cringe in front of powerful foreigners; or they tend to heckle and seek 
concessions relying on the influence of foreigners. In so dOing, the Korean 
people willingly surrender unconditionally to powerful nations externally 
and, internally, to those who are in high-ranking offices, powerful, and 
senior to them.73 
Korean intellectuals' introspective analysis of the people's national pride 
and its character showed a strong resemblance to that prevalent in China 
during the 1920s and 30s when the Chinese mood of cultural despair was 
so pervasive that it led to a period of "remorseless national self-flagellation" 
stimulated by Chinese intellectuals. Lloyd E. Eastman discusses the despair­
ing assessments of the Chinese people's character by many intellectuals of 
that time. He states: 
The Chinese were indolent, they feared difficulties, they lacked any progres­
sive spirit, they assumed no responsibility but waited for others to act for 
them, they had no concern for the collective welfare, they lacked human­
hearted ness. 74 
Hu Shi M�, a prominent Chinese intellectual, argued the Chinese failed 
to meet the new challenges of modern times because they had become "a 
spineless, worthless people" and because "our rottenness is so deep."75 There­
fore, many writers and scholars concluded that the Chinese were becoming 
an "'inferior race' (liedeng minzu ��.§�jiiD." Some went further, drawing 
the radical conclusion that the "inferior races will inevitably be destroyed in 
the struggle for survival," implying the inevitable ruin of the Chinese nation. 
The most radical analysis by intellectuals of the "despair and humiliation that 
Chinese felt in the early 1930s," however, called for a so-called "new style" 
dictatorship or despotism. Zhang Hong, a writer and former student of Hu 
Shih, described the type of despotism the Chinese wanted as follows: "[It] 
must not be a barbaric despotism, lawless despotism ... a stop-freedom-of­
speech despotism, but an enlightened despotism, a meaningful despotism, 
a put-public-welfare-first despotism.,,76 
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No Korean intellectual, regardless of their political persuasion, supported 
the idea of a dictatorship or despotism as openly and explicitly as the Chinese. 
However, their description of a strong leader was almost identical to that cited 
by Eastman as the Chinese intellectuals' version of "the ideal dictator" who 
had to be "a national leader who stood above class strife, above economic 
interests, and would strive for the welfare of the entire nation. He would be 
... a 'new-style' dictator.,,77 
Military Reappraisal and the May 16 Coup 
The "Clean-up the Military " Campaign 
While most of the populace was demanding "total reform,"  as expressed 
and articulated by many liberal intellectuals, what were the Korean militalY 
doing? Their activities, especially in terms of the militalY's own demands 
for radical reform, were extremely audacious, much more so than those of 
any civilian progressive reformist or political group at that time. As early as 
8 May 1960, less than two weeks after President Rhee resigned on 26 April 
1960, and just six days after the then Major-General Park Chung Hee had 
demanded the resignation of the Army's Chief of Staff, General Song Yoch'an. 
Eight lieutenant-colonels who were also graduates of the Eighth Class of the 
Military Academy launched their petition for what later became known as the 
"Clean-up the MilitalY" campaign against the corruption, financial irregularities, 
incompetence and factionalism of a number of commanding generals. 
In fact, this intra-military campaign developed rapidly into an extra-militalY 
clean-up movement of the entire armed forces, including the Marine Corps. 
This campaign resulted in the replacement of the three Chiefs of Staff of 
the Armed Forces (Army, Air Force and Navy), as well as the Marine Corps 
Commandant, within two months of the commencement of the campaign. Of 
these the replacement of the Marine Corps Commandant, Lieutenant-General 
Kim T'aesik, resulted not only in his retirement, but also in an open chal­
lenge, led by Brigadier-General Kim Tongha, the Commander of the First 
Marine Division, against his superior, alleging both political and financial 
corruption. In this process, Kim demonstrated the intensity of the push for 
military reform among junior-ranking officers. Confronted with forced retire­
ment, however, Kim Tongha aligned himself to other reformist colonels in 
their reform campaign and just one year later played a key role in the May 
16 militalY coup. 
The military's reform drive was therefore extremely serious and daring 
and, in retrospect, needs to be looked at in the context of the reformist 
colonels' military coup plot, originally set for 8 May 1960 and known as the 
"May 8 Plan." This coup plan was allegedly cancelled because of the unex­
pected student revolt of 19 April, which turned into the April Revolution. The 
Army's "silence" or "tolerance" towards the student demonstrations during 
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this time was highly praised by the public, with some portraying the Army as 
"angels from Heaven. ,,7S However, the real reason for the Army's silence and 
tolerance of the student demonstrations had less to do with the Army being 
"angels from Heaven" than with its division into two camps, the mainstream 
group and non-mainstream group, each sitting on the fence protecting its 
respective longer-term interests. 
The mainstream group-largely senior-ranking generals who had been 
personally nurtured in their careers by President Rhee-did not wish to 
jeopardize their careers by supporting President Rhee who, by the late 1950s, 
was no longer favored by American policy makers. The non-mainstream 
group-largely the reformist colonels and other junior-ranking officers in 
the Army-was heavily involved in its own coup attempt. In any case, most 
Koreans believed, and rightly so, that the success of the April Revolution was 
due to America's "moral and political support. ,,79 Some argue that the reform­
ist colonels aborted their planned coup because they, especially Park Chung 
Hee, believed that they would have had no credibility with the public if they 
had carried out a military coup in the midst of the Students' Revolution. 
Military Grievances 
Of course, while the coup was cancelled for the time being, the reformist 
colonels' coup plan was never entirely abandoned, but skillfully altered to 
incorporate a contingency plan in line with popular demands for total reform. 
According to Kim Chongp'il in 1998, the "Clean-up the Military" campaign 
intended to "bring out into the open their method of reform struggle" so 
that the reformist colonels could promote the unity of officers in the armed 
forces.so Kim's claim need not be the only explanation. What it reveals, how­
ever, is the reformist colonels' highly calculated, although extremely risky, 
strategy for mobilizing the military as their power base. In other words, the 
reformist colonels drew their power mostly from the collective grievances 
of the Korean military, especially those of junior level officers who, in the 
course of the rapid growth of the military,S! had been grossly disadvantaged 
in their career opportunities due to a lopsided hierarchical system. 
Most higher-ranking generals, for example, were the least trained (most 
for just forty-five days), and yet had been promoted to senior ranks, having 
mainly experience of military service in either the Japanese Imperial Army or 
Japanese Manchurian Forces. By 1960, all graduates of the First and Second 
Classes of 1946 had been promoted to ranks ranging from major general to 
general. In contrast, graduates from later years, especially the Academy's 
Eighth Class of 1949 had attained ranks from lieutenant colonel to full colo­
nel.S2 The difference in age between Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chongp'il, who 
was undoubtedly the most well-known member of the Eighth Class, and the 
army's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Chang Toyong, was just three years, 
the former being thirty-six and the latter thirty-nine at the time of the May 
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16 coup in 1961. Despite their obviously checkered career paths, however, 
the Eighth Class was a highly respected elite group in the army with a strong 
sense of nationalism and an egalitarian mentality. They were immensely proud 
and ambitious and, interestingly, had mostly rural backgrounds.83 
The Eighth Class had the largest number of graduates of all the Classes 
in the Academy, a total of 1,345 officers of whom less than 450 survived the 
Korean War. Against this background, the lieutenant-colonels of the Eighth 
Class exerted themselves as a reformist pressure group, whose opportunity 
to exploit the military's reform mood increased dramatically when the newly 
inaugurated Chang Government (23 August 1960) replaced the Defense 
Minister, Lieutenant-General Yi Chongch'an, with a civilian, Hyon Sokho. 
This increase in opportunity was particularly evident when, on 10 Septem­
ber, eleven colonels, including Kim Chongp'il, Kim Hoynguk, Kil Chaeho 
and others who had been involved in the "Clean-up the Military" campaign, 
pledged themselves to an armed revolution, thus forming the nucleus for a 
military coup known as the Ch 'ungmujang kyoru.84 
These reformist colonels claimed that they were driven to make their 
pledge after they had failed to see the Minister of Defense, Hyon,85 who 
had been out of his office when they had called on him. They reportedly 
planned to demand that all three-star generals-lieutenant generals-transfer 
to the reserve army, and that the future Army Chief of Staff and his deputy be 
appointed from within the rank of two-stars, which included Major General 
Park Chung Hee 86 Such a daring challenge was now conceivable because, 
in the eyes of these campaigners, the government no longer held the author­
ity to which they had formally owed allegiance once Lieutenant-General Yi 
had been removed from the Defense Ministry.87 These colonels, who were 
promised by Minister Hyon that a clean-up exercise would be carried out, 
became even more aggressive, despite being briefly interrogated by the 
militaIY police, when the next Defense Minister, Kwon Chungdon, another 
civilian, announced that he would appoint a military screening committee 
to clean up the military, especially its upper echelons. 
Concurrently, Park Chung Hee, the ultimate leader of the clean-up cam­
paigners, who had been demoted to the First Military District Command in 
Kwangju,  a post known to the army as absurdly insignificant, was moved back 
to Army Headquarters on 11 September as Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. 
This dramatic turnaround in Park's posting was effected by the new army 
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Ch'oe Kyongnok who, on 29 August, had 
replaced Lieutenant-General Ch'oe YonghiJi, yet another new Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the campaigners' perspective, this appointment 
had a psychological impact and signified a real change in military policy. 
Ch'oe Kyongnok publicly announced that, as the new army Chief of Staff, 
he supported the military's clean-up campaign which eased the immediate 
pressure on the Army hierarchy to contain the reformist campaigners. 
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In this context, Park Chung Hee's new assignment to Army Headquarters 
in Seoul was itself symbolic of Ch'oe's intention to clean up the army.88 
Psychologically, Park's transfer from the First Military District Command in 
Kwangju to Headquarters as the new deputy chief of staff had the immediate 
effect of raising the spirit of the military clean-up campaigners "sky high." 
By mid-September 1960, the Korean military had lost its stability and unity. 
The progressive build-up of grievances amongst two major groups within the 
military over the years immediately preceding this era of liberal thinking and 
calls for reform had begun to unravel the fabric of the Korean military. 
The senior officers were aggrieved because of the military's conflicting 
systems of seniority which made them feel resentful and insecure about their 
rank. And junior officers were aggrieved because of the stagnation of the 
military hierarchy. To them, the whole system was based on factionalism 
and favoritism which they saw as largely the product of the actions of both 
President Rhee and the US militaty advisers in Korea 89 The multiplicity of 
military grievances increased dramatically when the Government notified the 
United States at the Korea-America high-level talks on 25 August 1960 that 
it planned to reduce the armed forces by 100,000 personnel-initially it had 
aimed at a reduction of 200,000. This reduction meant that 17 per cent of the 
entire officer corps was under the threat of losing their livelihood without 
the protection of a pension. In this context, the collective grievances of the 
military became a decisive factor underpinning the reformist colonels' "Clean­
up the Military" campaign. 
Plotting the Military Coup 
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unexpected conflict emerged between high-level officials in Korea and the 
United States following a statement by General Williston B. Palmer, Director 
of Military Assistance in the Defense Department. Palmer had visited Seoul for 
two days from 18 to 20 September 1960 as a personal guest of General Ch'oe 
Y6nghOi, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. On the day before his departure, 
he made a public statement with the endorsement of General Ch'oe that he 
was personally opposed to the Army's purification campaign and that he 
also had doubts about the Korean Government's policy of reducing military 
manpower. These remarks immediately sparked strong reactions from both 
the Army Chief of Staff, Ch'oe Ky6ngnok, and the Defense Minister, Hyon 
S6kho. The former condemned it as a "clear violation of Korean sovereignty" 
and the latter as "interference in [the nation's] internal affairs."90 
The loudest protest came on the morning of 24 September when sixteen 
colonels, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Kim Chongp'i!, demanded the resignation 
of Ch'oe Y6nghOi on the grounds of alleged financial irregularities. This 
was a blatant counter attack by the reformist colonels on Ch'oe, who had 
attempted to prevent Park Chung Hee's return to Military Headquarters in 
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Seoul and continued to be unsympathetic towards their clean-up campaign. 
This revolt, known as haguksang sagan (revolt against the seniors), not only 
led to Ch'oe's fall from his post on October 15, but more importantly ac­
celerated the young colonels' plot to overthrow the Chang Government. In 
February 1961, the two key players in the haguksang sagan, were discharged 
from the army, albeit officially through "voluntary" resignations. One of these 
was Kim Chongp'il who offered his resignation under the strict agreement 
that the army would not punish Park Chung Hee for his connection with 
the haguksang sagan. 
Paradoxically, as Kim returned to civilian life, the reformist colonels' 
military coup plot became even more audacious, but no one in the military 
or the government took any firm measures against it. The only plan the mili­
tary contemplated and then only briefly was Park's retirement in May 1960. 
According to Yi Ch'olsLlDg, then Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee 
in the National Assembly, who led the influential junior members' faction, 
Sinp 'unghoe (New Breeze Club) of the ruling Democratic Party, Park's sched­
uled retirement was confirmed by Prime Minister Chang Myon when Park 
was at Army Headquarters in Seoul as deputy chief of staff for operations. Yi 
went on to say that, instead of being retired, Park was transferred to Taegu as 
a result of his recommendation to the Prime Minister 91 A counter-claim was 
made by former Lieutenant-General Chang Toyong, one of Park's long-time 
supporters, who was then Commander of the Second Army in Taegu. Chang 
claimed that he had directly requested headquarters to appoint Park as his 
deputy commander after hearing that Park was about to be discharged. 
Although both claims need to be considered with caution, it is obvious 
that Park had received extraordinary support from someone in power, if not 
General Chang himself, who appeared to have deliberately spread the rumor 
of Park's imminent removal from active duty in an effort to camouflage Park 
and his reformist colonels' secret coup plan. This hypothesis warrants close 
scrutiny because, by being transferred to the Second Army as Chang'S deputy 
commander, Park not only avoided retrenchment, if in fact the rumor was 
true, but also and more Significantly, obtained his permanency as major­
general on 20 February 1961, just one day before Chang's appointment as 
Army Chief of Staff. 
Most notably, by being transferred to the Second Army under Chang's 
obvious protection, Park was reunited with Major-General Yi Chuil, Chang's 
chief of staff, who was one of Park's oldest friends from their Manchukuo 
military training days, and a man who also played a key role in the May 16 
military coup. Although the accounts surrounding this particular issue have 
never been questioned by anyone to date, Park's transfer to the Second 
Army less than five months before the May 16 military coup seems too neat, 
in its timing, cause and effect, to be accepted at face value. Even so, that 
these events underscore the final preparations for Park's military coup has 
nevertheless taken root in the popular mindset. 
In regard to the timing of Park's coup in May, insiders have portrayed 
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Park as a desperate general tlying to save his career by locking himself into 
a do-or-die race against the clock from the moment, on 12 January 1961, 
that he and his reformist colonels learned that the army had included Park 
on a list of 153 officers to be moved to the Reserve Army in late May. Those 
insiders argue that Park had no option but to pre-empt the army's decision 
by staging a military coup before he was removed from the army. And so, 
in the pre-dawn hours of Tuesday, 16 May, Park would cross the Han River 
with a bandit-size revolutionary force of just 3,600 troops. 
Conclusion 
The background to the May 16 military coup of 1961 needs to be 
understood in two contexts: the Korean popular demand for total reform 
and strong leadership, and the increasingly destabilized military after the 
April Student Revolution, due largely to a major shake-up of the military 
hierarchy. In the case of the former, demands for reform were expressed by 
civilians, especially liberal intellectuals, politically sensitive urban citizens 
and students who, in reality, had very limited means, if any at all, to put 
their demands into effect. The only means at their disposal was to promote 
a popular consensus for total reform. 
In the case of the military, however, the demand was quite specific: 
clean-up the military. This demand was the subject of a bold campaign by 
Park and his reformist colonels who, in effect, caused Significant disruption 
within the military hierarchy, and enough confusion in the ranks of the gov­
ernment as to bring about its very downfall 92 Yet, the coup was generally 
seen as inevitable and necessary to bring about change in Korean society. 
Even the most reputable daily newspaper, Tonga Ilho, stated that Korean 
society at that time required total reform because it had lost its way due to 
"incumbent politicians' corruption, incompetence, inefficiency and . . .  chaotic 
factionalism. ,,93 
As tempting as it is to dismiss this view as all too obviously biased, and 
perhaps written under the coercion of the military junta, it nevel1heless reflects 
an important aspect of the popular mood concerning the Chang government. 
Similarly, the liberal intellectuals' demand for strong leadership (perhaps 
more so than their views on the principles of liberal democracy) provided a 
strategic basis for Park to seize upon that demand. Most notably, Park justified 
the coup on the same grounds that the liberal intellectuals had provided as 
a basis for a nationalist ideology, in both rhetoric and action. This is not to 
say, however, that the ideas of the liberal intellectuals discussed in this paper 
comprehensively represent their ideas, or fully explains the overall opinion 
of the majority of Koreans in the aftermath of the April Student Revolution. 
I have deliberately focused here on the intellectual debate on national 
development during the eleven months between the April Student Revolution 
and the May 16 military coup as being relevant to Park's reform agenda after 
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the coup and to his subsequent policies. To appreciate and understand this 
debate at that time, it is important to note that little did the intellectuals know, 
especially those whose articles on national development had been published 
in Sasanggye and who actively participated in the debate, that their ideas 
would be misappropriated to justify a military coup. This was evident when, 
in the July edition of Sasanggye, drafted in June-only one month after the 
coup-Chang Chunha argued that the military must return to democratic 
politics as soon as possible, and Ham S6kh6n bluntly stated that the people 
are silent because they are anesthetized by the sound of gunfire and that true 
revolution is something that neither students nor the soldiers can achieve, but 
only the people.94 What Ham and most Koreans did not realize, however, 
was that the road to the Korean people's revolution had already begun and 
that Park would be at the helm for the next eighteen years. 
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